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In high inflation  economies  exchange-rate-based  stabilizations
typically  start  with a boom, with the recession  coming later.  In
contrast,  in similar  programs  in the moderate  inflation  European
economies,  the  recession  generally  appears  upfront.  When such
programs  result  in a boom,  it is driven  by different  forces  than  in
the high inflation  economies.
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There is convincing  empirical  evidence  that the  Stabilization  in Demnark,  on the other  hand,
cycle for exchange-rate-based  disinflation  in  was expansionary.  The key question  is whether
high-inflation  Latin American  economies  this expansion  was similar to that in the high-
typically begins  with expansion  and ends in  inflation  Latin American  economics,  in origins
recession  - a surprising  pattern.  Ades,  Kiguel,  and characteristics.  It has been argued  that
and Liviatan  explore whether  a sirnilar  cycle can  expansion  in the high-inflation  economies  was
be observed  in exchange-rate-based  disinflation  caused  by the  perception  that the program  was
in low-inflation  economies.  temporary.  Expectations  of a future  reversal  led
to an increase  in spending  and output.  By
They draw on empirical  evidence  from  contrast,  expansion  in Denmark  appears  to have
stabilization  programs  in three European  coun-  been  driven  by opposite  forces  - by overconfi-
tries in the early 1980s:  in Denmark  (1982),  dence  about the speed of disinflation.
Ireland  (1982),  and France  (1983).  In these
programs,  the authorities  fixed  the central  parity  These findings  support  the view that the
of the exchange  rate band against  the European  high-inflation  economies  are a group to them-
currency  unit (ECU).  This represented  a break  selves.  In particular,  disinflation  in these  econo-
from previous  years when  this rate was  often  mies is likely to face obstacles  inherently  differ-
realigned  to accommodate  inflation.  ent from these  observed  in most industrial,  low-
inflation  countries.
They find that the Irish and French  r.ograms
followed  the more traditional  pattern In the  In addition,  the costs of exchange-rate-based
initial phase, there was a recession  accompanied  disinflation  are typically  experienced  at different
by a continuous,  gradual  reduction  in inflation  - times.  The recession  appears  upfront in industrial
followed  by a second,  more expansionary,  phase.  countries,  and at a later stage  in the high-infla-
The initial recession  was attributable  to a lack of  tion economies.
credibility  about  the  pace of disinflation  (re-
flected  in an increase  in real wages)  and a
reduction  in aggregate  demand resulting  from
tight monetary and fiscal  policies.
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The traditional  view is that disinflation  programs are contractionary  regardless  of whether  the
nominal  anchor is money or the exchange  rata. Nominal  price and wage rigidities  are the fundamental
cause  of the recession.' The disinflation  experiences  in the United States  under Volcker and the United
Kingdom  under Thatcher  confirmed  this view.
A recent study, Kiguel and Liviatan (1992), shows that in contrast to the traditional  view,
expansionary  stabilizations  have been the rule for a certain class of disinflations,  namely, exchange  rate
based stabilizations  (ERBS)  in "chronic  inflation"  countriew.  Almost every exchange rate based
stabilization  plan launched in Latin America over the last 30 years has been expansionary? Following
the fixing or predetermination  of the exchange  rate, a boom in consumption  and investment  was
observed. They argue that expectations  of a future reversal in policies, including  a devaluation,  triggers
a speculative  spending  boom. When agents expect an exchange  rate based stabilization  to be temporary
they will shift part of their future consumption  and investment  expenditures  to the present. One possible
reason, as discussed in Calvo (1986), is that when the rates of devaluation  and inflation  are low, the cost
of holding  money (which is necessary  to carry out expenditures)  is also low, while the opposite is true
for future periods when inflation  is expected  to resume. Alternatively,  one can explain a shift of future
expenditures  to the present if it is expected  that the failure to stabilize  will be associated  with a balance  of
payments  crisis, a credit squeeze and quantitative  import restrictions. All this will give rise to increased
expenditures  during the stabilization  period, accompanied  by a current account deficit and a real
appreciation  of the exchange  rate.
I The recession  can only be avoided if the change in policy is announced  and believed several periods
ahead. In this special case (unlikely  in a high inflation  country, as the government  would not be believed  if
it announced  a restrictive policy to go into effect in the future)  the disinflation  has no effects  on output.
2 A term coined by Pazos (1982) to refer to countries  with a long inflationary  history above the rates in
industrialized  countries,  where labor and capital  markets adjust to function  in the inflationary  environment.
3  Their sample of Latin American countries includes  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay.
They also study Israel.2
In Kiguel  and Liviatan (1992), both  the fixing  of the exchange  rate and lack of credibility in its
efficacy  constitute  necessary  conditions  for the emergence  of a business cycle driven by speculative
demand. This paper extends  their sample  of ERBS in an attempt  to compare the experience  of chronic
inflation  countries  to that of low inflation  countries. We thus take three European stabilizations  of the
1980's that used the exchange  rate as a nominal anchor: Denmark '82, Ireland '82 and France '83.'  Our
starting point is the observation  that the behavior  of real variables during disinflation  in the latter group
has not always fitted the pattern described  in Kiguel  and Liviatan (1992). On the surface, the experience
of Denmark  looks similar to that of chronic inflation  countries. There, the fixing of the exchange  rate
was followed  by expanding  output and falling unemployment.  Instead, Irelad  '82 and France '83 fit the
classical  recessionary  scenario. We compare the Latin American  and European experiences  below.
Our main argument is that, to a large extent, the differences  in outcomes are related to
expectations  about  how the disinflation  program would  proceed.  Credibility  played in the outcomes  of
the ERBSs  in our sample. 5 We distinguish  two types of credibility  problems: (i) expectations  of a total
collapse  of the plan with a future reversal of policies; and (ii) expectations  that the program will
eventually  succeed, but that disinflation  will proceed at a different  pace than the one announced.
Expectations  about the pace could be either optimistic  or pessimistic. We argue that the first concept is
more relevant  to the high inflation  economies  of Latin America, while the second one is better suited to
understand  disinflation  in the European economies. In Latin America, the boom was fueled by the
I There was a second Irish program in 1986. Of the two programs we only analyze  the first, as that was
the only one in which inflation  was a concern.
S Our approach should perhaps be seen as complementary  to that of Giavazzi  and Pagano (1990), that
also tries to explain the contrasting  experiences  of Denmark  and France during stabilization.  These authors
emphasize  the fiscal aspects  of the programs implemented  in those countries  and explain  the aforementioned
differences by subscribing to  the  "German view" on budget cutting. According to  this view,  fiscal
consolidation  has a benign impact on expectations  if it is accomplished  by cutting expenditures.  According
to Giavazzi  and Pagano, Denmark's fiscal consolidation  was achieved  by cutting expenditures.  This explains
the Danish expansion.3
expectation  that the collapse  of the program would be accompanied  by a balance  of payments crisis and
the imposition  of foreign exchange  controls.  In contrast, when the main concern was about  the pace (that
it would not be fast), there was a recussion  as a result of high real wages in the transition (as in France).
Finally, over-optimism  about the pace of disinflation  will generally  lead to a boom (as in Denmark).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the Latin American experience  of
disinflation  and discusses the main stylized facts concerning  the business  cycles in ERBS. Section  2 does
a similar thing for Europe. Our sample  of European  stabilizations  includes  Denmark '82, Ireland '82 and
France '83. In dealing with these three European  cases, we show that the exchange  rate was indeed the
nominal anchor chosen by the policy-maker.  Section 3 highlights  and explains  the differences  in the
patterns observed in Europe. Section  4 compares and explains  the differences  between  Latin America and
Denmark. Section  5 summarizes  the main results and concludes.
I. Latin America-
Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) deal with the effects of disinflation  in countries  with a long history of
inflation  above the rates in industrialized  countries, where labor and capital markets have adjusted  to
function in the inflationary  environment.  Their sample  is based on a number  of Latin American countries
and Israel. Their main finding is that stabilization  processes  in "chronic  inflation"  countries  do not
usually follow the standard  Phillips curve trade off in the medium run. Stabilization  programs in these
countries  are often associated  with what they call a "business  cycle": after a small initial recessionary
effect, or even with no effect of this kind, the reduction in inflation  is associated  with an initial expansion
of output above the historical  trend, and with a drop in unemployment.  The expansionary  phase can go
on for a number of years ending in a recession. Their finding  relates to programs which used the ex-
change rate as the main nominal anchor.4
Kiguel and Liviatan (1992)  deal with major stabilization  programs undertaken  over a period
covering the past three decades in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico  and Israel. In each decade,
there was a group of stabilization  programs which shared some important  common elements  concerning
the diagnosis  of inflation  and the deign of the appropriate  policies to deal with it. This is seen, for
example,  in the stabilization  programs of the 1980's, based on a shock treatment which took the form of
a drastic stop of inflation  supported  by initial wage-price  freezes. These programs were called heterodox
because  of the strong income  policy component,  but they also used the exchange rate as a nominal
anchor.
Contrary to the approach  of the 1980's, the philosophy  of the Southern Cone (Argentina,  Chile
and Uruguay)  stabilizations  of the 1970's embraced  a free market approach  that discredited  the use of
price controls and favored  the liberalization  of foreign  trade and capital flows. These programs evolved  in
two stages. The first was aimed at stopping  the accelerating  inflation.  It consisted  of a fiscal-monetary
package with a flexible  exchange  rate. The second implied  a shift to targeting  the exchange  rate as the
nominal anchor. It was motivated  to some extent by the slow  pace of disinflation  in the preceding stage.
In a more advanced  stage, these policies took the form of a preannounced  path of devaluations,
commonly  referred to as the Tablita. The sample  also includes  the Peronist stabilization  of 1973-75
which resembles  in some ways the Brazilian  Cruzado  plan. Both programs used comprehensive  wage-
price-exchange-rate  freezes which were not supported by a proper fiscal adjustment  and are usually
regarded as populist  policies.
According  to Kiguel and Liviatan (1992), the main features  that characterize  a "typical"  Latin
American  exchange rate based stabilization  are the following:
a)  Real Activity: In general, economic  expansion  starts quite soon after the initiation of the
stabilization  program. Usually, the behavior  of unemployment  Is compatible  with GDP growth, i.e.,
unemployment  falls in the growth phase of the cycle. As Kiguel  and Liviatan (1992) show, these5
expansions  in chronic inflation  countries  can be characterized  as such also with respect to the long term
trend. Most of the ERBSs  were preceded 'u, a recessionary  period relative to trend. This indicates  the
existence  of excess capacity  which may i,ave provided suitable  conditions,  from the supply side, for the
upswing.
b)  7he Balance of Payments:  It is characteristic  of all ERBSs  that they were associated  with
a deterioration  of the trade balance  in the course of the program. The normal case is that in the
expansionary  phase the current account  goes into the red. The capital inflows  which financed inese
deficits were, as a rule, reversed at some advanced  stage of the boom where the recessionary  phase
began. It was the inability  to finance the growing current account deficits that was, in most cases, the
immediate  reason for halting the boom.
c)  Relative Prices: As a rule, real wages increased  with the upswing  of economic  activity,
but sometimes  we observe a lag that can be due either to the fact that the real wage had been raised up
front to take account of the anticipated  erosion by the sluggish  reduction  in inflation  (as in the
Argentinean  stabilization  of 1967-70),  or to the case that the real wage was kept, for some time,
deliberately  below its equilibrium  level by incom; policies (as in Israel '85).
d)  Consumption  and Investment:  Most of the expansions  of output were accompanied  by a
"consumption  boom". By this we mean that consumption  grows faster than GDP when the latter
accelerates  (or is above  normal). Investment  played a dominant  role in the Argentinean  program of the
1960's, much of it being directly induced  by government  policies. In the programs of the 1970's it was
the Chilean ERBS which was driven by a continuous  investment  boom. The role of investment  was not
significant  in the ERBS of the 1980's. This was partly related to the reduction in capital inflows
following  the debt crisis.
e)  Fiscal Stance: In Kiguel  and Liviatan  (1992), fiscal variables  do not appear explicitly
related  to what explains  the boom. They note that normally  the stabilization  cycle appears in spite of a6
sharp reduction in the fiscal deficit. However, they do not make any distinction  about what the main
source of the fiscal consolidation  was, namely, tax increases  or expenditures  cuts.
Table 1 and figure I show the behavior  of main economic  indicators during the 1978-81
Argentine  stabilization.  As we can see, it fits the pattern described  by Kiguel  and Liviatan (1992).
Tabl. 1. Main Economic Indicators During Argentine 1978-81  Stabilization
Indicator  1950-70  |  1978  j  1979  1980  |  1981
GDP Growth  3.6  -3.4  7.6  1.1  -6.3
CA Surplus/Exports  24.5  -5.8  -48.3  -43.8
Real Effective  Ex. Rate  94.9  102.9  77.2  69.2  87.0
Real Wage Index  72.3  83.0  92.8  83.0
IIrflation  Rate  23.8  175.5  159.5  100.8  104.5
Public Sec. Surplus/GNP  -3.2  -2.7  -3.6  -8.1
Growth of Private Consumption  3.22  -3.07  14.39  5.59  -3.64
Source:  Ramos (1986)
The main conclusion  of Kiguel  and Liviatan (1992) is that the expansionary  phase of ERBS can
be explained  as a speculative  boom that builds on the expectation  of future reversals  of policy. The role
that credibility  plays is that of being absent. In their view, it is because agents  expect the stabilization  to
be only temporary  that they shift future consumption  and investment 6 expenditures  to the present. This
behavior soon leads to a real exchange  rate appreciation,  current account  deficits and the collapse of the
plan.
6  Investment and durables consumption  are the components  of expenditures that are most affected by
speculative  activity. They are also both greatly affected  by falls in real interest rates, as the ones observed
in the "tablita" stabilizations  during the late 1970s.7
Figure 1. Argentina: Growth of Total Consumption
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The Brazilian Cruzado  Plan, implemented  in February of 1986, also illustrates  the important  role
that temporariness  plays in generating  speculative  booms. The plan rested on the premise that the high
rates of inflation  were driven by inertia and inde  ition. 7 The key elements  of the plan were, thus, a
strong incomes  policy, with loose fiscal and monetary  policies. Soon after the announcement,  it became
clear that the program was unsustai;able. If agents  hold rational expectations,  we should observe a
negative  correlation  between  the size of the speculative  boom and the duration of the plan. 8 This
prediction is borne out by the Brazilian  experience.  During the Cruzado plan (which  lasted for less than a
year) private consumption  increased  b,  9.3 %.
'See  Cardoso (1991) for a good description  of the Brazilian  experience.
8 See Calvo (1986).8
II. Denmark, Ireland and France
There were large differences  in rates of inflation  across Europe in the early eighties. The second
oil shock affected  these countries in quite different ways. In Germany  and the Netherlands  the rate of CPI
inflation  never exceeded  an annual rate of 6.8 per cent and was already close to 3.0 per cent in 1983.
Instead, CPI inflation  reached 12.31 per cent in Denmark  in 1980, 13.4 per cent in France in 1981,
17.97 per cent in Great Britain in 1980, 20.43 per cent in Ireland in 1981 and 21.28 per cent in Italy in
1980. In addition, in most of these countries inflation  did not come  back to values close to 3 per cent at
least until 1986.
It has been argued that the Exchange  Rate Mechanism  of the European Monetary  System (EMS)
itself may have been responsible  for the inflation  reduction  and convergence  which member countries
have experienced.  Empirical research has not been able to provide conclusive  evidence  on the importance
that EMS membership  had for the speed and cost of disinflation.  One strand of research has tried to
identify if EMS .nembership  has conferred special disinflation  advantages  in the sense of accelerating
inflation  convergence.  The evidence  is not conclusive.  Both K. Rogoff and S. Collins emphasize  that
inflation  convergence  did not occur in the first few years of the EMS. A tendency towards convergence
only started after 1982, at a time in which, mostly  through income  policies and monetary  restraint, many
countries  had already brought down considerably  their inflation  rates from their peaks in 1980 and 1981.
Dornbusch  (1989) follows  a different approach.  He focuses  on sacrifice  ratios 9. If EMS membership
conveys  special disinflation  advantages,  he argues, we would expect lower sacrifice  ratios for EMS
members. Dornbusch's conclusion  is that EMS membership  does not make for small sacrifice  ratios. The
evidence  bears out the view that EMS membership  can make disinflation  cheaper.
9 Sacrifice  ratios are defined  as the ratio of the extra percentage  points of unemployment  to the percentage
points of reduction in inflation.9
It seems, thus, that belonging  to the EMS did not necessarily  mean that a) the exchange  rate was
the nominal anchor chosen, or that b) credibility  in the program was high. We therefore take three
countries (Denmark,  France and Ireland) that effectively  chose  and actively  used  the exchange  rate as the
nominal  anchor. We do not assume credibility  right away from the mere fact of belonging  to the EMS.
We argue, instead, that the higher or lower degree of credibility  that the different programs enjoyed
explains  the different behavior  that economic  activity  had in these countries.
2.1. The Exchange Rate as Nominal  Anchor
Before 1982, there is very little evidence  of any EMS country (except the Netherlands)  actively
using the exchange  rate to disinflate. The situation  changed  quite drastically  in 1982-83, especially  in the
three European countries in our sample. Determining  which was the nominal  anchor chosen in EMS
countries is in many cases difficult  to assess, particularly,  if there was no announcement  by the economic
authorities.  This was especially  so in France, where if there was an announcement  at all, it was to signal
money  as the anchor. There are, however, two 'natural" indicators  that show that the exchange  rate was
the nominal  anchor chosen in Denmark,  France and Ireland. These are the central parity against  the
ECU, and the bilateral real exchange  rate (deflated  by CPI) vis-a-vis  the German  mark.10
Flgure 2. Denmark:  Central  Parity Against  the ECU.
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Figures 2 to 4 show a remarkable  change  in the behavior  of the central  parity against the ECU in
all three countries. As we can see, while in France and Denmark  this change seems to have taken place
contemporaneously  with the announcement  of the stabilization  plan, in Ireland this might have happened
some time later, around March 1983.
The behavior of the bilateral real exchange  rate vis-a-vis  the German mark was consistent  with
the use of it as the nominal anchor. In the three cases, it experienced  a severe appreciation.  This was
most dramatic  in the case of Denmark  and France, whose real exchange  rates depreciated  prior to
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2.2. Inflation, Interest Rates and Fiscal Stance
By the end of 1982, economic  performance  looked quite somber in the three countries  under
consideration.
2.2.1. Denmark.
In Denmark, inflation  was still above 10 per cent in 1982. This was lower than the 12.31 per
cent peak of 1980, but it was still 5 percentage  points higher than in Germanv.  Danish public debt was
growing rapidly (from 29 per cent of GDP at the beginning  of 1980  to 65 per cent at the end of 1982),
fueled by high real interest rates and large primarv deficits (3.1 per cent of GDP). Unemployment  was
4.2 percentage  points higher relative  to 1979, and the current account  had worsened, bringing  external
debt from 17.5 per cent to 33 per cent of GDP over the same interval. In October 1982, long- term
interest rates reached 22 per cent.
At that time, a Conservative  coalition  formed a new government  and presented its economic
program at the opening  session  on October  5. The program featured strong measures  on three fronts.
First, income  policies that implied  wage freezes and limitations  to indexation  of wages and social
transfers were implemented.'"  The second front of action was the fiscal one. Giavazzi  and Pagano
(1990) report that "within  four years, the turnaround  in the in the full-employment  primary budget was as
'"A total wage freeze was imposed  as from October  5, 1982, to March 1, 1983, with the possibility  of
an extension  until April 1, when  the current wage agreements  in the public and private labor markets  expire.
Furthermore, the cost of living adjustment of wages and social transfers, with the exception of social
pensions. would be suspended  in the period January 1983  to 1985. Wage agreements  covering  the next two
vears were to be concluded in the public sector ahead of those in the private labor market. The wage
increases  for public sector emplovees  were to be kept within  a limit of 4 per cent per year. Wage agreements
in the private sector would be carried through without  government  interference,  but if the wage agreements
resulted in increases of only about 4 per cent a year, the government  would consider implementing  a tax
reduction. Incomes  policies were supplemented  in April 1983, when the government  announced  guidelines
for an upper-limit  of 2 per cent for the annual wage increase in the new two-vear  wage agreement.13
large as 10 per cent of GDP, of which 2.8 per cent was accounted  for by a fall in government
consumption,  0.4 per cent by cuts in government  investment  and the rest by discretionary  increases in
taxes net of transfers."'  Finally, in the monetary area, the package  was accompanied  by the
announcement  that the exchange  rate of the Danish kroner versus  the German  mark would henceforth  be
fixed.
2.2.2. Ireland.
In Ireland, the height of instability  prevailed  at the beginning  of 1982 when the government  fell
on the issue of a tight budget. Certainly  the need for austerity  had been clear at least since 1981. CPI
inflation  peaked during that year, reaching  20.43 per cent. Similarly,  the long term interest differential
with Germany  increased  sharply toward the end of 1981 and the beginning  of 1982. Public  finances were
in much worse situation  than those in Denmark. As a share of GDP, the primary-full  employment  rudget
deficit was 8.4 per cent, debt service absorbed 8.. per cent, and total national  debt was 87 per cent.
This situation persisted  until early 1982  when a political consensus  emerged  to push forward specific
measures for disinflation,  austerity and fiscal consolidation.  According  to Dornbusch  (1989), the
consensus  supported  four  specific  policy  measures.  First, a shift  towards  consistently  positive  and  high
real interest rates" 2. Second, a fiscal policy of consistently  reducing  the primary deficit (by 1984  the
full-employment  primary deficit had been reduced  by more than 7 percentage  points of GDP) mostly
through higher discretionary  taxes. Third, partly as a result of rising unemployment,  partly as a result of
wage agreements,  the increase in labor compensation  slowed  down from 18.1 per cent in 1981 to only
11  According  to our figures from OECD National Income  Accounts and Economic  Outlook, the fiscal
consolidation  implied  an improvement  of 6.1 per cent in the structural  budget  balance, of which 5.1 per cent
was achieved  through cuts in government  consumption.
12 According to Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), ex-ante real interest rates not only fell in Ireland but,
moreover, they turned negative.14
14.4 per cent in 1982. Fourth, the monetary  authorities  pegged the value of the Irish  punt within the EMS
and, thus, relative  to the German  mark. It is especially  significant,  as Dornbusch  points out, that in both
1982 EMS realignments  Ireland maintained  the central rate. Not taking advantage  of an EMS
realignment,  he says, signified  a shift from an accommodating  exchange-rate  policy to a determined  effort
to squeeze  inflation  by the use of the exchange  rate.
2.2.3. France.
The case of France is somewhat  different. The program  of March 1983 constituted  quite a drastic
turnaround  in the Socialist  government's  economic  policies. Indeed, President  Mitterrand enjoyed from
the beginning  more budgetary  freedom of manoeuvre  than was actually  available  to most other European
countries  because  the bright side of the Giscard and Barre legacy resided in public finances. France's
public debt (relative  to GDP) was in 1980  one of the smallest among  OECD countries. It is not
surprising, as Sachs and Wyplosz  (1986)  conclude, that the Socialists  took advantage  of the fiscal
prudence  legacy.  The first two years of the government  of President  Mitterrand  were thus characterized
by fiscal expansion  with monetary accomnmodation,  minimum  wage policies, a reduction  of the work
week, and new laws concerning  labor relations.
The evolution  of the French economy  during 1981-83  failed to conform  to the Government's
expectations.  GDP growth was lower than forecasted, inflation  was higher, unemployment  did not fall
and the Franc suffered several crises. Unlike other OECD countries,  French GDP never fell during those
years. On the other hand, inflation,  that increased  after the oil shock, increased  again in 1982, while
most other countries were achieving;  significant  reductions.  The government  was also confronted  with
several speculative  attacks on the franc, having to devalue in October 1981  and June 1982. This second
time, the devaluation  was accompanied  by a price and wage freeze, a rise in social security contributions
and a reduction in the targeted  budget deficit  to a level not higher than 3 per cent of GDP. A third15
devaluation  came in March 1983, and with it a reshuffling  of the cabinet  and a fundamental  shift in
economic  policies. Citing Le Point, Sachs and Wyplosz  (1986)  say that when Mitterrand assigned  new
tasks in 1983  to Mauroy's new government,  he asked him to 'bring down inflation  to a rate compatible
with our competitors..  .restore within  two years our external  trade balance...and respect the financial
equilibrium  of Social Security  while maintaining  the public budget  deficit within its current levels'.
OECD figures confirm the restrictive  stance of fiscal policy after 1983: the structural deficit was reduced
0.5 per cent of GDP. This was achieved  by freezing budget  expenses  and by raising taxes. '3 Monetary
policy also remained  contractionary  although  the squeeze, according  to Sachs and Wyplosz, came through
high interest rates instead of through credit ceilings. The role of the exchange  rate is more difficult  to
assess. Unlike  the Danish and Irish plans, there was to our knowledge  no official  announcement  that the
exchange  rate of the French franc versus the German  mark would  henceforth  be fixed.
2.3. Outcome  of the Three Programs
The reason for including  Denmark, France and Ireland in our sample is not only that they were
the three most clear cut cases of use of the exchange  rate as nominal anchor. We were also motivated  by
the striking  differences  that we observed in the behavior  of real variables among  them and when we
contrast them with the Latin American cases.
13 The fiscal package included a forced savings  plan equivalent  to an extra 10 per cent on income  tax,
a 1 per cent levy on taxable income and rises in the tax on alcohol and tobacco and higher prices for gas,
telephone,  electricity and rail transport, as well as higher wealth taxes. The main cuts in expenditure  were
earmarked  to come from a reduction in subsidies  to state owned energy and transport firms.16
2.3.1. Denmark.
In Denmark, rather than reducing  aggregate  demand  and income, disinflation  was accompanied
by an average growth rate of GDP of 3.7 per cent over the years 1983  to 1986. Growth  was driven by
domestic  demand, with private consumption  growing (over the same period) at an average of 4.4 per cent
a year and business investment  at 13.1 per cent (all data are drawn from OECD National  Income
Accounts). Figure 5 shows the spectacular  behavior  of manufacturing  employment  during stabilization,
and table 2 shows the growth rates of GDP and its components  over the same period.
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As we can see, there was a quite important  rise in GDP growth after stabilization. 14 This was
mainly led by a spectacular  behavior  of investment  expenditures.  There is a cycle as in Latin America.
14 For Denmark, the inflation  series was smoothed  using standard  exponential  smoothing  techniques  and
a value of ca=0.3.17
Two features make the Danish experience  fundamentally  different from that of most Latin
American expansionary  ERBS. The first, is that real wages fell during the initial stage of the program.
The second, is that although  the current account worsened  (reaching  a deficit of 5.4 per cent of GDP in
1986) it was brought under control and the plan did not end in a balance  of payments  crisis.
Table 2. Growth Rates of GDP and its Components in Denmark: 1978-90.
Growth of  GDP  Government  Private  Private
l_____________  Consumption  Consumption  Investment
1979-81  0.7  4.2  -1.5  -9.4
1982  3.0  3.1  1.4  19.9
1983  2.5  0.0  2.6  2.7
1984  4.4  0.0  3.4  12.1
1985  4.3  2.5  5.0  18.9
1986  3.6  0.5  5.7  18.8
1987  -0.5  2.5  -1.5  0.0
1988  0.9  0.2  0.0  0.0
1989  1.1  0.0  0.0  2.7
Source: OECD National  Income Accounts.
3.3.2. Ireland.
The case of Ireland sharply contrasts  with that of Denmark. While GDP did not grow on average
during the period 1982-84  (after being negative  in 1982 and 1983), consumption  fell by 7.1 per cent in
1982  and remained almost flat during the following  two years. Business investment  experienced  negative
growth rates from 1982  to 1987. Figure 6 shows that the behavior  of manufacturing  employment  and
inflation  fit the classical  recessionary  scenario. If the recession  was not deeper, it was because in the
1982-84  period Irish exports fared exceptionally  well on international  markets.1
Figure 6. Ireland: Manufacturing Employment and Inflation.
Source: IMFIFS.
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3.3.3  France
France is an intermediate  case, though definitely  more on the contraction  side of the spectrum.
Contrary to the case of Ireland, GDP never fell. However, its growth rates were considerably
below those of the OECD average until 1986. Although consumption  growth fell, it was business
investment  that suffered the most dramatic  blow, falling an average of 3.1 per cent per annum in the
period 1983-84.19
Figure 7. France:  Industrial  Employment  and Inflation.
Source: IMFIFS.
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Again, figure 7 shows that the behavior  of industrial employment  and inflation  fit the classical
recessionary scenario.
IV.  Theoretical  Aspects of Exchange  Rate Based Stabilizations
Two questions  arise after comparing  the behavior of real variables during stabilization  both
among  European countries and with Latin America. The first, is whether  the expansion  observed in
Denmark  after 1982 was of the same nature as those observed in Latin America and Israel. In other
words, was it mostly speculative  in nature, based on lack of credibility  about the final success of
disinflation?.  If not, what explains  it?. The second question is how to understand  what happened  in
France and Ireland as opposed  to what happened in Denmark. Why were the former contractionary  while
the latter was expansionary?.  As we will see, the comparison  of Denmark with France and Ireland
provides important  insights regarding the role that credibility  plays in ERBS in low inflation  countries.20
4.1. The Role of Credibility
Stabilizations  are periods during which major changes  in agents' behavior  take place. A reduction
in the inflation  rate changes  the environment  in which agents operate and affects their behavior. In
addition, the mere announcement  by the government  of a disinflation  package is usually enough  to trigger
drastic changes  in expectations.  The behavior  of economic  agents  will reflect the changes in both the
environment  and their expectations.  In turn, the performance  of the economy  during disinflation  will be
determined  by the way in which agents behave.
It is therefore important  to keep in mind the different effects that can come into play during
stabilization,  and how they are conditioned  by agents  behavior and expectations:
a)  On the demand  side, we can have: (i) "speculative  effects", that build on future reversals
of policy, and that cause a shift of future consumption  and investment  expenditures  to the present, (ii)
"permanent  income effects", that can be optimistic  or pessimistic,  and are motivated  by the effects that
the disinflation  is thought to have on future output, (iii) "uncertainty  reduction  effects", that cause  an
increase in demand through a reduction in precautionary  savings, and (iv) "fiscal effects", that arise from
the fact that disinflation  usually  suggests (though  not always entails) fiscal austerity;  fiscal effects can act
directly upon demand in a Keynesian  way (by affecting  government  expenditures  and taxes) or indirectly,
by affecting  expectations  A-la-"German  view"".
b)  On the supply side, we can have two type of forces: (i) an expansionary  force, originating
from the strong leveling  effect that exchange  rate stabilization  usually has on prices, allowing  an increase
in efficiency  through the reduction of excessive  variation in relative prices and through a shifting  of
resources out of financial and speculative  activities,  and (ii) a force acting through changes in real wages
15  A reduction in inflation  can also have favorable  distributional  effects, as argued by Dornbusch  et al.
(1990), as inflation  is a highly regressive  tax.21
(generated  by expectations  of future inflation  and/or inflation  inertia)  that cause movements  along the
demand  curve for labor and have strong effects on unemployment.
Of course, not all of the effects mentioned  above will necessarily  be present in every
stabilization.  Two factors determine  the importance  that each of those effects will play:
The first, is the rate of inflation  at the time of stabilization.  If the inflation  rate is within the three
digit range, effects like those described  under a(iii) or b(i) above are bound to be present and large.
Instead, if the inflation  rate is close to 10%, those forces, though perhaps also present, are not likely to
have large effects on output.
The second factor is the way in which agents' expectations  react to the stabilization
announcement.  To a great extent, this reaction  will be determined  by past stabilization  experiences.  In an
environment  where failed stabilizations  are the rule, agents are most likely to be skeptical  at about the
final success  of the stabilization  effort. Kiguel  and Liviatan (1992) argue that this has been the case for
most Latin American  experiences,  where agents  expected  a total collapse of the plan in the medium run.
In those cases, credibility  problems  implied  the expectation  of policy reversals in the near future and led
to speculative  booms  with  effects  such  as those  described  under  a(i). Instead,  where  failed  stabilization
experiences  are not the rule, or in economies  where government  behavior is conditioned  by international
agreements,  credibility  problems  are likely to take a different form. We argue that in these cases agents
might have doubts about the  pace  of the disinflation.  Under such circumstances,  effects as those
described  under b(ii) play an important  role. In addition, "permanent  income  effects" as those described
under a(ii) might also act on the demand  side.
A comparison  of Denmark  with France and Ireland, and Denmark with Latin America shows the
importance  that the effects mentioned  above have played during the different stabilization  experiences  in
our sample. The model develop in Calvo (1986)  proves useful to illustrate  the difference  between  the
two types of credibility. An anticipated  complete  reversal of the initial disinflation  will lead agents to22
substitute  present consumption  for future one, as the cost of the latter is larger in the context of a cash in
advance model. In contrast, when there are expectations  of a slower pace of disinflation  than the
announced  one, it will lead to a substitution  of consumption  from the present to the future, thus creating
a recessionary  tendency at the early stage.
4.2. Denmark  vs. France  and Ireland
In Denmark, disinflation  was accompanied  by an average GDP growth of 3.7 per cent over the
years 1983  to 1986. Instead, in France and Ireland the reduction of inflation  to levels compatible  wit
those of other OECD countries  brought about severe reductions  in output growth and employment.  What
explains  this difference?.
Expectations  seem to have played an important  role. This role was not similar to that played in
Latin America. There, the issue was whether  the stabilization  would  be long lasting or not. This question
mark was not present in Europe. Instead, agents' expectations  operated through two different channels,
explaining  the striking  differences  in the behavior of real variables:
The first channel was an "over-confidence"  effect observed in Denmark. The mere announcement
of the disinflation  program by the government  triggered very optimistic  hopes for future activity. This
expectations  operated on the demand  side, and explain  the increase in consumption  expenditures  and the
spectacular  behavior  of investment.  These optimistic  expectations  are consistently  revealed  for the case of
Denmark  by various indicators  of future economic  activity" 6.
Figure 8 shows a comparison  of the Index of General  Economic  Situation  and real GDP. The Index of
General Economic  Situation  (GES)  provides a forecast  of the following  year's state of the economy."
IG  This section uses different indicators of consumer confidence  published by European Economy
Supplement  B. See Appendix 1 for details.
17The series shown in figures 8 to 10, and 12 have been standardized  so that they all have a comparable
variation.  The rescaling  procedure used was to subtract the mean and divide by the standard  deviation.23
Notice that the GES rose sharply in Denmark  in 1983.18  Instead, the results for France and Ixelaud  are
dramatic. As figures 9 and 10 show, expectations  about future economic  performance  were very poor in
these two countries. Moreover, those expectations  consistently  underestimated  the performance  of the
economy  during stabilization.
Figure 8. France:  GDP and General  Economic  Situation  Forecasted  at t-l.
Source:  OECD National Income Accounts  and European  Economy  Supplemenlt  B.
l  9  10  12
7  Notice that the forecast for 1984  was done in 1983. As the Danish stabilization  was launched at the
end of 1982, 1984 is the year we want to focus our attention  on.24
Figure 9. Ireland: GDP and General Economic Situation Forecasted at t-1
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Figure 11 confirms  that agents held pessimistic  expectations  about future economic  activity  in
France and Ireland." 9
It is important  to compare the GES with actual GDP. In Denmark, the GES rose sharply after
1983.  We have argued that the Danish expansion  was dominated  by an "over-confidence"  boom. Bruno
and Meridor (1991)  simply refer, instead, to "confidence"  booms when they analyze  the last Israeli
stabilization.' Figure 8 shows that optimistic  expectations  in Denmark  were only granted to a limited
extent. Indeed, both in 1984  and 1985  the value taken by the Index of General  Economic  Situation
exceeded  the actual value of real GDP.
19  The Consumer  Confidence  Index is an arithmetic  average  of the responses  (balances)  to the questions
on financial situation  of households  and the general economic  situation  (past and future)  and questions  about
the present major purchases of households.  See Appendix 1 for more details.
21 Bruno and Meridor (1991) assign an important role to  optimistic expectations in explaining the
behavior of consumption  during the last Israeli stabilization.  They say that when 'a  stabilization  program
succeeds in correcting fundamental  factors, there will be an increase in perceived  permanent income and
wealth, which in turn will manifest  itself in an increase  in both consumption  and investment".25
The behavior of stock prices immediately  after the announcement  of the program can also be seen
as an indicator  of optimism  or pessimismn.  Figure 12 shows a very different  reaction in real share prices
in Denmark as compared to France and Ireland. In Denmark, the real value of the Danish Real Industrial
Share Price Index almost  doubled in one year after October 1982.
But agents' expectations  also operated through a second channel, which had important
implications  for aggregate  supply. French and Irish agents seem to have had doubts about the  pace of the
disinflation.  It was not, as we have already emphasized  that agents  had doubts about the final success of
disinflation.  Instead, the cases of France and Ireland show that economic  agents thought  the inflation
targets of the policymaker  to be too optimistic.
Figure 10. France and Ireland:  Consumer Confidence  Index.
Source: European Economy Supplement B.
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Figure 11. Denmark, France and Ireland: Real Share Price Index (normalized).
Source: IMFIFS.
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Expectations  about the pace of the disinflation  play a significant  role in the determination  of both
the real interest rate and real wages. For instance, if expectations  turn to be pessimistic  ex-post, we
should observe an increase  in both real wages and the interest rate. In turn, the behavior  of the real wage
and the real interest during stabilization  explain much of output  developments  through their effect on
supply. 2' We thus focused  on real interest rates and tried to discover  any major shift at the time of the
stabilization  that could distinguish  Denmark  from France and Ireland. The evidence  obtained  by looking
at ex-post real interest rates is shown in figures 13 to 15.
21 It might be worth having in mind the case of the chronic inflation  countries in Latin America. The
evidence  provided by Corbo (1985) and Ramos (1986) is consistent  in that real interest rates fell in the
Southern Cone stabilizations  of the late 1970's. However, Kiguel and Liviatan report that this feature was
not shared by the stabilization  programs in the 1980's. They also mention that real interest rates rose to
extremely  high levels in the course of the stabilization  program  that started in Argentina  and Israel in 1985.27




Figure 13. France: Ex-post Real Interest Rates (annualized).
Source: IMFIFS.
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We computed  ex-post real interest rates for the deposit, lending  and treasury  bill rates when
available.' The data shows that all types of real interest rates decreased in Denmark  but increased in
Ireland and France.
Figure 14. Ireland:  Ex-post Real interest  Rates (annualized).
Source: IMFIFS.
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The behavior  of real wages is consistent  with that of the real interest rate. While real wages fell
in Denmark  post-stabilization,  the opposite  happened  in France and Ireland. The behavior of real wages
2The formula used was the following:
r, = i,  - [(cpi+ 1/cpi,) 4 -1]
where r is the ex-post real interest rate and i is the nominal interest rate.
2 This effect might be only part of the explanation.  Monetary  policy might also explain  this difference
between  real interest rates. We tried to see if monetary  policy was contractionary  in France and Ireland, and
if that could explain  the apparent  rise in interest rates. When  we normalized  the real growth of money  to take
account for GDP growth, we could not get any conclusive  evidence.29
in Denmark as opposed  to France and Ireland can be easily understood if one thinks of the realized real
wage in the following  terms:
(at =  li  + Et-,  lx  - t
where cot  is the realized real wage at time t, g  is a target real wage, E.-i  7rt  is the expectation  at time t-1
of inflation  at time t, and 7rt  is the inflation  at time t. In such a simple setup, the behavior of the real
wage will be determined  by the difference  between  expected  and actual inflation.
Finally, long term nominal interest rates confirm  this view as the fall was much less steep in
France and Ireland as compared  to Denmark.
The effects mentioned  above explain  the different  patterns observed in real variables in the three
countries in our sample:
In Denmark, the announcement  of the disinflation  program led to over optimistic  expectations  in
terms of future output and inflation  developments.  These operated on the demand  side, leading to a very
strong investment  boom. In turn, optimism about  future inflation  developments  led to a fall in real wages
and real interest rates, that had a positive influence  on supply.
Instead, in France and Ireland  the prospects  for future output were believed  to be somber. In
addition, the policyniaker  was thought to be too optimistic  in terms of inflation  reduction. Pessimism
about future output developments  added to doubts about  the pace of the disinflation  had depressing effects
on aggregate  demand  and aggregate  supply. With regard to the first, they explain the lack of an
investment  or consumption  boom. On the other hand, the increase experienced  by all type of real interest
rates and real wages operated on the cost side pushing  the unemployment  rate up in the classical
unemployment  fashion, i.e., moving  along the demand  for labor.30
4.3. Denmark  vs. Latin America and Israel
The second question  that arises when comparing  the behavior  of real variables during stabilization
in Europe and Latin America is if the expansion  that followed  Denmark's exchange  rate based stabiliza-
tion was of the same sort as those observed in chronic  inflation  countries, i.e. generated  by the belief that
the program was temporary only, and that a major reversal of policy would take place sooner or later.
We gave already some sort of negative  answer when we compared  Denmark to France and Ireland. We
there showed  how the Index of GES and the behavior of the stock market seemed  to indicate  that Danish
consumers  and firms were confident  about stabilization.
In this section, we intend  to show that there are some other indicators  that reveal that the Danish
expansion  was quite different in nature from those observed in Latin America. We acknowledge,
however, the inherent difficulty  of such pursuit. Several statistics  that one can think of as good indicators
of speculative  behavior might only reflect optimism  about  future output trends.
Table 3. Real Share Prices in Chile and Denmark  (Quarterly  data)
Country  Factor by which Real Share
Prices should be multiplied
Chile: 76.1 to 80.3  1  13.30
Denmark: 80.1 to 86.1  T  5.18
Sources: IMFIFS for Chile and Mexico; OECD Main Economic  Indicators  for Denmark.
The behavior of the stock market is one such indicator.  Ramos (1986) notes that the stock market
boomed  during each of the Southern Cone Stabilizations.  Perhaps, the magnitude  of the boom may help
us distinguish  between speculative  and optimistic  behavior. We analyzed  the cases of Chile during the
Tablita, and Denmark. There are two quite astonishing  differences  among these two countries. The first
is the dramatic reversal in real share prices experienced  by Chile. The second, is the size of the boom31
itself. We compared real share prices between  the peak and the previous through in Chile and Denmark.
Our results are summarized  in Table 3.
A second indicator  that we use to distinguish  between speculative  and optimistic  behavior  is the
growth rate of the shares of private consumption  and investment  to GDP. Demand  booms based on the
expectation  of a future policy reversals  will be characterized  by strong consumption  effects. Instead  fears
of future policy reversals  will lead to low investment  rates in the private sector. As argued in Morales
(1991), "the persistent weakness  of public finances  may awaken  fears of future confiscatory  measures
against the private sector through exchange-rate  manipulations,  punitive  taxes, or outright expropriation".
We should thus expect to observe different patterns in credible  and non-credible  expansionary
stabilizations:  in stabilizations  of the first type, we should expect to see investment  playing a leading role
in the demand boom; instead, when expansions  are of a speculative  nature, consumption  will dominate.
We therefore averaged  the annual  growth rate of the share of private consumption  to GDP for years of
major stabilization  programs in Latin America and Denmark. We did the same thing with investment.
The results are, we think, quite striking. They are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 shows two major difference  between  the roles that private consumption  and investment
played during the stabilization  booms in chronic inflation  countries  and Denmark. The first, is that in
Latin America  the share of private consumption  typically increased  more than the share of investment
during stabilization.  This is especially  so if one takes only the stabilization  plans of 1970-90.  For this
sub-sample,  the growth in the share of private consumption  is almost 30 per cent higher that if one takes32
Table 4. Average Growth  Rate of Share  of Private Consumption
and Total Investment  in GDP During  Disinflation.
Sample  Private Consumption  Investment
Latin America and Israel: 1960-90  1.8 %  -0.24 %
Latin America and Israel: 1970-90  2.22 %  -3.9 %
Latin America in the 1960s  0.5 %  2.9 %
Latin America during the Tablitas  1.2 %  -0.11 %
Latin America in the 1980s  1.6 %  0.32 %
Israel  3.7 %  -4.1 %
Denmark: 1983-1986  0.7 %  9.4%
Note: For Latin America, Investment  stands for total investment.  For Denmark, we used Private non
residential capital  formation.
Sources: For Latin America  and Israel, Kiguel  and Liviatan 1992; for Denmark, OECD National
Income Accounts.
the whole sample. These results are consistent  with the idea that beliefs  on future reversals  of policy were
grounded on previous failed stabilizations.  This effect is expected  to have become very significant  since
the 1970's.33
The second major difference  is that the roles of consumption  and investment  are drastically
reversed in Denmark. Here, the increase in the share of investment  is almost thirteen times as large as
the corresponding  consumption  figure.
Figure 15. Denmark: Index of Consumer Confidence.
Source:European Economy Supplement B.
Finally, thie  best indicator  of how confident  were Danish agents about  the stabilization  is given  by
the Index of Consumer  Confidence.  This index clearly reflects a change in consumer's  mood after
stabilization  was announced.  As Figure 16 shows, Denmark's index rose sharply in 1983.
What explains  the Danish boom? A combination  of factors. On the one !land, optimistic
expectations  of future output trends led to a boom in aggregate  demand  were permanent  income
considerations  played an important  role. Also, optimistic  views about the  pace of the disinflation  seem to
have helped in reducing  the real wage and keeping  the real interest rate under control. These had
favorable  effects on supply, allowing  for an output expansion  that granted, at least partially, the initially
optimistic  expectations.  Though Demnmark  did eventually  suffer from current account  problems, the34
expansion  in output, the cut in government  expenditures  and, possibly, the openness  of its economy
helped her avoid a balance of payments  crisis. Finally, we should mention  the possibility  that
considerations  of the type described in Giavazzi  and Pagano (1990)  might have also played an
independent  role.'
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper compared  the exchange  rate based stabilization  experiences  in the high inflation
economies  of Latin America with those of Denmark, France and Ireland in the eighties. The analysis  was
motivated  by the finding  that during most of the programs in "chronic inflation"  countries  and in
Denmark, a demand boom followed  the fixing of the exchange  rate.
We argued, following  Kiguel  and Liviatan  (1992), that the initial  expansion  in the Latin American
experiences  is to a large extent due to lack of credibility. While the programs in France and Ireland were
recessionary, it would be wrong to conclude  that this resulted from "too much" credibility. In fact, these
two programs faced problems  that are typical of stabilization  efforts in low inflation  economies.  Agents
had pessimistic  expectations  about  the pace of disinflation  because  there were nominal  rigidities in prices
and wages which the program was not expected  to be able to overcome. In addition, the increase in real
wages and real interest rates that followed  the announcement  of stabilization  also operated in a
contractionary  fashion.
The pattern of disinflation  in Denmark, on the other hand, at first sight looks similar to that of
chronic inflation  countries.  The fixing of the exchange  rate was followed  by expanding  output and falling
unemployment.  However, we showed  that unlike the chronic inflation  countries, Danish agents  did not
24  Giavazzi  and Pagano explain the Danish expansion  by subscribing  to what is known  as the "German
View" on budget  cutting. They argue that the leading  factor explaining  the expansion  is that it was preceded
by a fiscal consolidation  that was accomplished  by cutting expenditures.  If the reduction in expenditures  is
understood to be part of a credible medium-run program designed to permanently reduce the share of
government  in GDP, it will have a benign impact  in expectations.35
expect a reversal of policies in the near future. The survey evidence  provided  by European  Economy
supports  this view. If anything, Denmark  suffered from a problem  of over-confidence.  The announcement
of the plan was followed  by very optimistic  expectations  about future output  developments.  Permanent
income  considerations  can thus explain much of the demand boom. In addition, this boom might have
been reinforced by effects of the "German  view" type, as argued  by Giavazzi  and Pagano (1990). These
demand  side effects were reinforced on the supply side by optimism  about  the pace of disinflation,  that
led to a fall in both real wages and real interest rates.
One important  implication  of the present  paper is that it provides supporting  evidence  to the view
that the high inflation  economies  are a group in themselves.  In particular, disinflation  in these economies
is likely to face obstacles  that are inherently  different from those observed in most industrialized,  low
inflation  countries.36
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Appendix I
European  Economy  runs a consumer  survey on a monthly  basis. The results are published  as the
following  7 indexes:
1)  Confidence  Indicator
2)  Financial Situation  of Households:  (i) over the last 12 months; (ii) over the next 12
months.
3)  General  Economic  Situation:  (i) over the last 12 months; (ii) over the next 12 months.
4)  Major Purchases: (i) at present; (ii) over the next 12 months.
The questions  asked are the following:
- How does the financial  situation  of your household  now compare with what it was 12
months ago? got a lot better, got a little better, stayed  the same, got a little worse, got a
lot worse, don't know.
- How do you think the financial  position  of your household  will change over the next 12
months?  get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot
worse, don't know.
- How do you think the general economic  situation in this country  has changed  over the last
12 months?  got a lot better, got a little better, stayed  the same, got a little worse, got a
lot worse, don't know.
- How do you think the general economic  situation  in this country  will develop  over the
next 12 months?  get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a
lot worse, don't know.
- Compared  with what it was 12 months ago, do you think the cost of living is now: very
much higher, quite a bit higher, a little higher, about the same, lower, don't know?
- By comparison  with what is happening  now, do you think that in the next 12 months:
there will be a more rapid increase in price trends, prices will increase  at the same rate,
prices will increase at a slower  rate, prices will stay about  the same, prices will fall
slightly, don't know?
How do you think the level of unemployment  in the country will change over the next 12
months?  Will it increase sharply, increase  slightly, remain the same, fall slightly, fall
sharply, don't know?
Do you think that there is an advantage  for people to make major purchases (furniture,
washing  machines,, TV sets, etc) at the present time? yes, now is the right time; it is
neither the right nor the wrong time; no, it is the wrong time, the purchase  should be
postponed;  don't know.39
Over the next 12 months, how do you think the amount of money you will spend on
major purchases will compare  with what you spent over the last 12 months?  Will it be:
much more, a little more, about the same, a little less, much less, don't know.
In view of the general economic  situation, do you think this is: a very good time to save,
quite a good time to save, rather an unfavorable  time to save, a very unfavorable  time to
save, don't know?
Over the next 12 months, how likely are you to be able to save any money?  very likely,
fairly likely, fairly unlikely, very unlikely, don't know.
Which of these statements  best describes  the present financial  situation  of your household?
we are running into debt, we are having  to draw on our savings, we are just managing  to
make ends meet on our income, we are saving a little, we are saving a lot, don't know.Policy  Research Working Paper Series
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